Federal Procedure -- Diversity of Citizenship -- Corporations by unknown
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 5 Number 4 Article 13 
6-1-1951 
Federal Procedure -- Diversity of Citizenship -- Corporations 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Federal Procedure -- Diversity of Citizenship -- Corporations, 5 U. Miami L. Rev. 624 (1951) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol5/iss4/13 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
body, the constitutional protection of his day in court. Under proper cir-
cumstances, personal constitutional guaranties may be made secondary to
the preservation of our order)" The instant case raises a doubt as to the
existence of such an emergency and by its result, perhaps, may provide some
measure of gratification to that ideology which delights in pointing out de-
fects in our system of government.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP -
CORPORATIONS
Plaintiff, a citizen of New Jersey sued the defendant, incorporated in
both New York and New Jersey, in the federal district court of New Jersey.
A motion to dismiss was granted by the district court and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. Held, judgment reversed. Incorporation in plaintiff's state in ad-
dition to New York does not defeat federal jurisdiction based on diversity.
Gavin v. Hudson 6 Manhattan R.R., 185 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950).
The citizenship of the members of the early corporations determined
the citizenship of those entities.' Today, a conclusive presumption exists
that a corporation is a citizen of the state of its creation. 2 Under this pre-
sumption, a problem of federal diversity jurisdiction is raised with respect
to those corporations chartered in more than one state.3
Apparently the best method of determination of corporate citizenship
in states other than the one of original creation is by examination of the cor-
porate history. When incorporated in the manner followed by any entity,
as if incorporated for the first time, it is a citizen of that state. 4 A corpora-
tion forced to incorporate as a condition for doing business in the state
(domestication) is for limited purposes a citizen of that state excluding
diversity jurisdiction. The corporation which registers in the state without
any pretense at incorporation is for all purposes an alien.,
The facts surrounding a merger or consolidation are often so compli-.
cated that it is difficult to determine whether the company is incorporated,
domesticated, or licensed. Consolidation results in a new corporation com-
46. Schenek v. United States, supra note 35; Gitlow v. New York, supra note 35.
1. Bank of the United States v. Devaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U.S. 1809) (citizenship of
the persons composing the corporation determines the citizenship of the corporation).
2. Louisville, Cincinnati, & C. R.R. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U.S. 1884) (citizenship
of the members is immaterial).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (Stipp. 1950).
4. Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270 (U.S. 1871). (A corporation
could "only be brought into court as a citizen of that state [the second state], whatever
its status or citizenship may be elsewhere.")
5. Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326 (1903); Evans, The Removal of Causes,
33 VA. L. Rsv. 445, 459 (1947).
6. Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 151 U.S. 673 (1894); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. St. Louis, Alton, & T.H. R.R., 118 U.S. 290 (1886).
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posed of two or more dissolved ones.7 Merger leaves one corporation alive,
simply absorbing those dissolved.8 An example of a close situation one
may encounter is a combination, followed by the granting and acceptance
of a charter of "consolidation and merger."' In this situation one particular
jurisdiction10 interpreted the charter as an enabling act and found a merger,
not a consolidation, because they looked to the contracts of reorganization
which indicated the intent to merge. As the surviving corporation was for-
eign to the jurisdiction, the court retained the case, but had it held that
there was a consolidation it could have found that the new corporation
succeeded to the charter rights of the defunct one and in this suit to have
lost the privilege of diversity.
A second, and confusing, situation arises when individuals incorporate
under the same name in two or more states. Following this they acquire a
new charter in each state permitting consolidation." Jurisdiction due to
diversity of citizenship would then depend upon which corporate entity
was being sued and where.12
The third situation involves the purchase of the assets only of one cor-
poration by a foreign corporation. The purchaser does not incorporate in
the seller's state nor does the seller become defunct, but the plaintiff, who
is aware of the true owner and operator, sues the out of state corporation
and alleges it as a corporation of the seller's state, demanding diversity
federal jurisdiction.' s
Many cases do not go into the corporate history and assume that the
litigant is a full-fledged corporation. Whether by assumption or conclusion
that the litigant is a corporation of two or more states, the cases are legion
which lay down the following general rule. A multi-state corporation is a
citizen in the state of the forum, therefore, if suit is brought by or against
a corporation in the adversary's state and it is one of the states of incorpor-
ation there is no diversity. 1"
The court in the instant case does not think that combination by
merger or consolidation is important"' but takes judicial notice of a consol-
idation without saying more.16 Cases are cited which are contra to the
7. Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 150 Fed. 775 (4th Cir. 1906) (these terms
are often confused or used interchangeably).
8. Id.
9. Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., supra note 7.
10. Circuit Court of S.C., suj'ra note 7.
11. Nashua & Lowell R.R. v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 136 U.S, 356 (1890).
12. Cf. Goodwin v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 124 Fed. 358, 362-366 (1st Cir.
1903).
13. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896).
14. Patch v. Wabash R.R., 207 U.S. 277 (1907)- Boston & M. R.R. v. Hurd, 108
Fed. 116 (Ist Cir. 1901), cert. denied, 184 U.S. 700 (1902); Allegheny County v.
Cleveland & P. Ry., 51 Pa. 228 (1865).
15. 185 F.2d 104, 106 n.7.
16, Id. at 105, n.1.
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court's position'7 including Supreme Court decisions,"R yet the court denies
that there is any Supreme Court authority in point."' Of those cases cited
as being contra to this position, Pennsylvania R.R. v. St. Louis, Alton 6 T.
H. R.R.2 is anomalous in holding that the plaintiff was not a corporation
of the second state but only licensed therein, which fact indicates the neces-
sity of examining the corporate history. In such a situation Judge Goodrich,
himself, states that there would be no problem. 21 Again, he says that the
Supreme Court has not considered the problem since 1912,22 although, in
fact, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1936.231
The rationale of the court's opposition to the general rules seems to
lie in the statement that the plaintiff need only cross over into New York
in order to get federal diversity jurisdiction. rrhis appears unnecessary in
view of the fact that there is actually only one operating road regardless of
the number of charters it possesses.24 The writer believes this idea is funda-
mental to the court's decision and indicates its desire to have the majority
rule reversed. Judge Kaufman arrived at the same result in New York in
1950. 2" If this case is appealed it will surely be reversed under the great
weight of authority unless it and the New York case represent a new trend.
TAXATION-A TRUST RES AS A MEMBER OF A PARTNERSHIP
Plaintiff, member of a partnership, created a trust for the benefit of
his son and daughter from a portion of his share of the partnership. The
indenture of trust named plaintiff and two others as trustees and provided
that, as to the trustees and beneficiaries, a trust and not a partnership was
created. The indenture further provided that the trustees should not be
personally liable as partners in the firm. The plaintiff seeks a refund of
federal income taxes alleging that the trust res created is a valid member
of the partnership for federal income tax purposes. Held, a trust res cannot
be a member of a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Hanson v.
Birmingham, 92 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
A membership of a partnership at Common Law must meet the follow-
ing essential requirements: (1) the ability to contract,' (2) the assmnption
17. Id. at 105, n.4.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 107.
20. 118 U.S. 290 (1886).
21. 185 F.2d 104, 107.
22. Ibid.
23. Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line RR, 81 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936).
24. 185 F.2d 104, 105.
25. Lucas v. New York Central R.R., 88 F. Stipp. 536 (S.O..N.Y. 1950).
1. Kasch v. Comm'r, 63 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 644
(1933).
